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SolLution of the Palestinian refugees (PR) is integral to 
the ongoing peace process between the Arab countries and 
Israel as well as  the negotiations between Israel,  and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)  .  The refugee issue 
is  politically  significant  because  a  majority  of  the 
Palestinians are classified as refugees  .  They f  clrm  large 
conglomerations in the host countries in which they reside 
and therefore can have a political impact if  they were to 
participate  in  political  activity.  Furthermore,  the 
Palestinians have become politically alert especially since 
the intifada and it would be unwise to ignore them in any 
solution to the Arab Israeli conflict that may be pursued. 
The refugee question,  however, is important in economic 
and social respects as well.  The Palestinian refugees embody 
a  large  stock  of  human  capital  which  is  underutilized 
primarily because of their political status in the countries 
of current residence and because of the ongoing conflict with 
Israel.  Their mobility is restricted in most cases, their 
economic: decisions are not free and their opportunities are 
not based on merit. As a result their product is presumably 
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meetings, Washington, D.C.,  January 6-8, 1994 far below their capabilities.  This underutilized capital is 
reflected in the quality of life they experience, the level 
of  unem:ployment they  suffer,  and  the  inequality  of 
opportuni.ty  they face wherever they reside in the Middle East 
compared with the citizens of  those countries. Th.e  loss, 
however, is shared by  the Palestinians themselves and the 
countries:  in which they reside.. 
The PR  are in an almost unique situation also because 
of the apparent common conviction that even  after a peace 
settlement with Israel has been concluded, they will. not be 
able to return to their homes or country--a similar situation 
has been evolving for  the Bosnian Muslims who are being 
evicted in the process of  what has become known as ethnic 
cleansing. The PR are therefore threatened with the permanent 
loss  of  identity as Palestinians and  of  their homes and 
country.  The loss, however, would not be as devastating as 
it sounds if it were the result of a voluntary decision by 
Palestinians to migrate or assume another national identity. 
The critical nature of this status is clearly reflected in 
the ambivalent attitude of the Palestinians of Jordan. While 
they have acquired citizenship, or the right to citizenship, 
form a majority of the population of Jordan, elect and get 
elected, and travel on Jordanian passports, they still call 
themselves Palestinians rather than Jordanians, and act as if 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is their own.  Even those 
who  were  born  in  Jordan  and  have  never  set  foot  on Palestinian soil  behave  as  if  they  were  only  recently 
displaced and turned into refugees. 
Another  feature  that  adds  gravity  to  the  refugees 
situation is that a high percentage of those registered as 
refugees live in camps, in very crowded houses, with few of 
the amenities of life enjoyed by others.  They depend on the 
good will of the host country, aid from the United Nations, 
and  employment  opportunities  that  cannot  be  frilled  by 
citizens of the employing countries. 
These conditions have prevailed as long as the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict has continued.  Now that conflict is in 
the process of being resolved the refugee status has become 
anachronistic.  A solution has to be found that will do at 
least two things:  enhance the peace process, and give the 
Palestinians  refugees  the  opportunity  to  rehabilitate 
themselves as citizens and productive people.  I propose, 
first, that without resolution of  the refugee problem the 
peace  process  may  be  seriously  handicapped.  Second, 
resettlement of the PR outside Palestine is the only viable 
option. Third, If given viable alternatives to returning to 
Palestine, the majority will choose another option. Fourth, 
the Gulf countries should be a  mutually most  attractive 
destination for resettlement.  Finally, resettlement would 
most  successful  if  the  PR  take  personal  leconomic 
responsibility; therefore, financing resettlement should be 
by interest-free loans rather than by grants. In  the  next  section we  shall  look  at  the size and 
distribution of the refugee population;  next I shall explore 
the possible solutions which have been discussed in the 
1iteratu:re;  In the final section I shall propose what  I 
consider to be most viable solutions or approaches to the 
problem a.nd the steps to take in the immediate future. 
Profile  of  the  Palestinian  Refugees. 
The PR  are a relatively small  segment of  the  total 
refugee population.  As of  1993  there were 18.2 million 
people registered as refugees around the world. Another 24 
million people were recorded as displaced within their own 
countries.  The largest single group are Afghans, followed by 
the Palestinians, Yugoslavs, and Mozambiquis  .  Refugees and 
displaced people exist in all continents, in virtually all 
cases as a result of  civil wars and therefore hope to return 
to their homes once such wars come to an end--as noted above 
the Palestinians and Bosnian Muslims are exceptions.  The 
Palestinians have been scattered around the world, but those 
holding a refugee status are concentrated in Middle Eastern 
countries, as follows: North Africa, 9,400; Syria,  299,200; 
Lebanon, 319,400; West Bank,  459,100;  Gaza Strip,  560,200; 
Jordan, 1-,010,700.*  [World Refugee Survey, 1993, as reported 
in  the  l~ritannica  Book  of  the  Year,  1994,  Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.,  1994, p. 2541  Others may be 
regarded as refugees but are not registered as  su.ch  with 
UNRWA and therefore may not be included in these statistics, 
though any decision made regarding refugees would effect them as well. The PR have acquired fairly high levels of education 
through UNRWA, generosity of the host countries, and aid from 
international foundations.  Their level of skill is  above 
average  for  any  country  in  the  Middle  East, with  the 
exception  of  Israel.  Their  ability  to  participate  in 
productive economic life has varied according to the country 
in  which  they  reside,  ranging  from  full  equality  of 
opportunity,  as in Syria, to highly restricted activities as 
in the Gulf countries. The same variation applies to their 
freedom of mobility, educational and health privileges, and 
social ;status. However, except in Jordan, the Palestinians 
have no political freedom.  They cannot participat-e  in the 
political affairs of the country of residence, regardless how 
long they have been in that country. This is the symbol of 
statelessness since they became refugees. The assumption is 
that a resolution of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will 
also resolve their  refugee problem and restore to these 
stateless people full political rights as commensurate with 
the national status of free people. 
The  economic  and  political  status  of  thle  PR  is 
complicated  by  a  number  of  conditions. First, they  are 
concentrated  in  relatively  resource-poor  countries  and 
regions such as Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.  Second, 
because  of  their  concentration  they  dominate  in  the 
localities in which they reside in the respective countries 
and  hence  can  make  a  difference  if  they  were  active 
participants in the politics of  the country. Third, their numbers continue to rise rapidly through natural growth-- 
though not much more rapidly than the growth of the native 
population. Fourth, in addition to their stateless status, 
the PR a.re  still considered  outsiders by the citizens of 
the countries in which they reside.  Their refugee status is 
actually reinforced by the attitude of the people of the host 
country.  Hence, resolution of the refugee problem must cope 
with all  these  conditions  and  make  it  possible  for  the 
Palestin.ians  to free themselves of the refugee status,  both 
technically  and  behaviorally.*  [For  a  vivid  detailed 
description  of  the  refugee  conditions  see  Don  Perez, 
"Palestinian Refugees and Middle East Stability," Washington, 
D.C.:  DARSP,  Nov. 19921 
Before  proceeding  to  explore  solutions  we  should 
distinguish between two groups of refugees, those within the 
Occupied Territories  (OT) and those outside it.  The former 
group already resides within the Palestinian territory and, 
therefore, once the political conflict has been resolved,  the 
solution to  its problems will be primarily economic and 
social.  The political solution is part of the peace process. 
Those who reside outside the OT face territorial, political, 
as  well  as  social  and  economic  problems  that:  await 
resolution.  These distinctions will be elaborated,  in the 
next section. 
Potential  Resolutions  of  the  Refugee  Problems: 
A. Territorial and Political Solutions. The question of 
territory and political status has in effect been resolved for the two groups of  refugees, those who reside in the OT 
but have been displaced from their homes and live in camps 
and those who have been displaced but do not live i.n camps. 
These groups, which number around one million,  are wfithin the 
Palestinian territory and will enjoy the same right.s  as the 
Palestinians who have remained in their homes in the OT. 
Their problem is primarily social and economic. 
Another group whose resettlement and political status 
have  been  essentially  resolved  includes  those  who  are 
considered  potential  returnees  to  the  OT  by  the  PLO 
leadership, estimated at about 750,000  people.* [A statement 
to that effect was made by  Nabeel Shaath at the Carnegie 
Mellon University conference ...; See also George Abed, ed., 
The Economic Viabilitv of a Palestinian State ,  Washington, 
D.C.:  Institute for Palestine Studies,  p. 61  These potential 
returnees will probably be involved in the administration of 
the  Palestinian entity  and  their  families,  comfing  from 
various parts  of  the diaspora.  How they will be chosen 
remains for the Palestinian authorities to determine.  For 
our purposes, however, this group can be removed from the 
status  of  refugees  from  the  political  and  identity 
standpoints. 
Another assessment of potential returnees has been made 
in the jYaster~lannina  the State of  Palestine . *  [Ramalla, 
West Bank: The Center for Engineering and Planning, March 
1992 pp. 3,  1341  According to this estimate between 250,000 
and 750,000  refugees will return during each of  the first five years of statehood.  If 1.5 million refugees were to 
return from the outside in addition to the refugees who are 
already within the OT, then the total refugee popu1at:ion  will 
be virtually resettled within the Palestinian entity.  In 
that  case, the remaining problems would be  econo:mic and 
social  rehabilitation  and  development.  However,  it  is 
doubtful that that many will return. 
In  my  previous  study, with  Haim  Darin-Drabkin, we 
proposed an economic plan that would absorb all the refugees 
within the state."  [The Economic Case for Palestine ,  Croom- 
Helm, 19'781  We believed then as I do believe now that the 
Palestinian economy can absorb all the refugees.  However, I 
am not as confident that the road to economic viability with 
all  the refugees returning would be as smooth now as it 
seemed then, nor do I believe that as large a percentage of 
refugees would be as eager to return now as were then.As to 
the econclmic viability question, the population has increased 
dramatically in the meantime, but the resources have not; 
actually the resources have declined because of  capital 
destructiion and deterioration of  the infrastructure under 
occupation.  Furthermore, I  suggest that refugee expectations 
have changed both on account of  political development and 
divisionism among Palestinians,  and because of the passage of 
time and potential prospects elsewhere.  Therefore I would 
estimate the potential returnees to be no more than those 
estimated by PLO leaders (750,000)  .  I adopt this estimate on 
the assumption that the PLO will play  a central role in facilitating  the  return  of  refugees  in  due  course, 
facilitate employment and housing,  and ease their integration 
in the community. Without PLO approval, those who return on 
their own will probably face risks of unemployment, housing 
shortage, and  difficulty  of  fitting  in  the  community. 
Therefore, the decision to return or not to return.  will be 
made on the basis of comparison between available options and 
the better the alternative option, the fewer refugees will 
opt to return to Palestine. 
The non-returning refugees will form the crux of the PR 
pending territorial and political status problem.  These are 
concentrated in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.  Although the 
Jordanian authorities have  expressed  little displeasure 
towards integration of the Palestinians in Jordan, they have 
shown concern regarding  the capability of  the Jordanian 
economy to absorb them.  More indirectly,  however, there has 
been concern regarding the role the Palestinian may play in 
the politics of Jordan onice they are convinced that Jordan is 
their ultimate home country. Such concern is  significant for 
the majority of Palestinians in Jordan, those who reside in 
refugee camps or  who have not  become  integrated  in  the 
Jordanian society and polity.  *[Some of these people will be 
among the potential returnees to the Palestinian entity.] 
However, some of  those returnees will also come from 
Lebanon and Syria.  In any case, the fate of  those who are 
not accounted for so far,  a little over one million people, 
is crucial to a successful peace settlement. It is with these refugees th'at  I shall be concerned in the rest of this paper. 
Several options have been recurrent in the literature as 
hypothetical solution though only some of them are feasible. 
Probably the most desirable though not evidently feasible 
solution is for the refugees to return home to  Palestine, 
either to their original homes or at least to the Palestinian 
entity.  However, this solution has been acknowledged as 
physica1l.y  'and  political unfeasible,  as has been apparent for 
a long  time. Therefore,  substitute  solutions have been 
discussed.  One of these is a formal recognition of the right 
of the refugees to return home as per UN Resolution 194 but 
not its implementation; instead viable alternative options 
for resettlement would be provided. Thus the refugees would 
have the formal right to return but practical difficulties 
would be allowed to preclude implementation. The argument for 
this pro:posal  is  that  it resolves the political identity 
crisis of t:he  PR and reduces the problem to the securement of 
territoria1L  space  for  resettlement  outside  Palestinian 
territory. *[I  discussed one version of this solution in my 
Peacemaki~  and the Immoral War. Arabs and Jews in the Middle 
East, Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 97-100; for a recent explicit 
statemen
t
.  of this approach to the Palestinian right of return 
see Ziad Abu Zayyad,  'The  Palestinian Right of  Return: A 
Realistic:  Approach,  "  Palestine-Israel Journal, #  2, Spring 
1994, pp. 74-8; for changing interpretations of  that right 
see Rashid Khalidi, "Observations on the Right of Right of Return, '  ,Journal  of Palestine Studies,  vol. 21, #  2, Winter 
1982,  pp. 20-4011 
Resettlement outside  the  Palestinian entity  may be 
planned according to one of several possibilities. Probably 
the  easiest  solution  from  a  logistical  standpoint  is 
resettlement in the host country. In that case the refugee 
camps  will  be  dismantled  and  their  occupants  will  be 
encouraged to seek their place of residence anywhere in the 
respective country.  Though in some countries new communities 
are established to house resettled refugees,  it is important 
that  freedom  of  choice  of  residence  and  community  be 
respected..  Such  a  solution,  however,  is  replete  with 
political, economic, and social difficulties.  For instance, 
transforming the refugees into citizens with full political 
rights could alter the shape of the polity in the respective 
countries  to  an  extent  that  the  citizens  would  not  be 
comfortable with that transformation,  as may be the case in 
Lebanon. Another obstacle to  this solution is the limited 
absorptive capacity of most countries of the region.,  unless 
large sums of capital are invested in them. Lebanon provides 
a good illustration of this handicap.  A third obs:tacle  is 
social in the sense that the Palestinian refugees have not 
always been welcome in the host countries and  resettlement 
on a permanent basis may create social conflict .with  the 
native people.  Therefore, while this solution may seem most 
logical, other options must be considered. Another option is to encourage or plan resettlement in 
Arab countries which have sufficient absorptive capaczity and 
political maturity and stability to  be able to stand the 
shock of large numbers of newcomers to the country to share 
citizenship and participate in the polity.  Syria is one such 
country;  Iraq is another; Sudan is a third.  Although these 
countries  have  political  troubles  of  their  own, the 
resettlement of  a few hundred thousand Palestinians within 
their  territories will not  make  much difference  to  the 
stability of  the political system in the country;  on the 
contrary, such resettlement may help to create stability by 
bringing in new ideas and human resources.  A varia.tion  of 
this option is to offer the Palestinian refugees a place for 
resettlement while at the same time allowing them to obtain a 
Palestinian citizenship and thus retain their Palestinian 
identity.  This  option, however, is  unstable  since  a 
Palestinian citizenship away from Palestine can have only a 
symbolic meaning and may not be adequate to substit.ute  for 
the political and psychological benefits inherent in active 
citizenship within a country. 
My preferred resettlement option outside the current 
host countries is to resettle most refugees as citizens in 
the oil exporting countries which suffer from labor shortage, 
especially the Gulf states. Such a program of resettlement 
would have mutual benefits to the refugees and the adopted 
countries.  First, the Gulf states need labor to keep their 
economies fully functional;  having citizens employed is more desirable than having migrant labor.  Second, as citizens, 
the new settlers can be  selected so as to  maximize the 
benefits to both parties, including loyalty to the new home 
state.  Third, the benefits these countries can offer should 
be a suf:ficient  incentive for the new citizens to integrate 
in society and avoid any activity that might threaten these 
benefits;,  especially in view of the fact that the return to 
Palestine is no longer an option.  Finally, the Palestinian 
settlers will offer the new home countries large stocks of 
human capital at little or no cost;  they will come with 
training and skills to put to work in the economy. This is 
how the New World has been built, and how Israel has managed 
to develop its economy as an island within an underdeveloped 
region. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
jointly have the capacity to absorb and the need for all the 
non-returning refugees who might opt  to  settle in  those 
countries. 
Sti.11 another  option  is  to  encourage  mobility and 
resettlement outside the Arab countries and the Mid.dle East 
region.  A million people can be easily absorbed in  the new 
world, the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, 
and New Zealand.  This solution is most attractive from the 
standpoint of  the opportunities it offers to the individuals 
who take advantage of it.  It is, however, costly to those 
who desire to  retain their Palestinian or  Arab identity 
beyond one generation or who believe that they have a role to 
play in the creation and nourishment of the new Palestinian entity. Resettlement outside the region implies willingness 
to be assimilated into the new community one joins.  These 
various solutions are not mutually exclusive.  They may all 
be applied according to the place and resources available to 
make  them  successful.  This leads us to  the  social and 
economic solutions. 
B. Social  and  Economic  Solutions.  In order to  be 
successful these various solutions have certain requirements 
in common.  First and foremost the Palestinian refugees, as 
groups and as individuals,  must have a say in the choice of 
the solution applied to them.  Second, whatever solution is 
opted for, it must give sufficient promise that the living 
conditions of the resettled family will be improved socially 
and  economically and  that  its  members  will become  more 
productive, independent, and free  .  A third prerequisite is 
the provision of sufficient resources for viable resettlement 
according to the new environment.  Probably a major source of 
success would  be the ability to match resource availability 
with potential occupations and skills of the settlers to the 
extent possible. 
On the other hand, there are certain conditions to be 
avoided i.f resettlement is to succeed and the refugee status 
is  to  be  abolished. For example,  there should not be a 
single hint or implication that the resettled people are 
undesirable  in the Palestinian entity.  A second condition 
to  be avoided  is  the selection of  country or region for 
resettle~nent  according to  ethnic, religious, or economic class background of the settlers.  To suggest that one's 
religious beliefs or affiliation or that economic wealth will 
be  the determining factor in  the choice of  resettlement 
destination can be a source of  instability and  threaten a 
backlash  against  resettlement  outside  the  Palestinian 
entity.  Another implication to dispel is that resettlement 
outside  the  Palestinian  entity  is  evidence  of  Israel's 
victory or Palestine's defeat in the conflict.  Resettlement 
should  be  projected as  the  best  possible solution of  a 
conflict, reached  through  negotiation, and  implemented 
through cooperation between the refugees themselves and the 
respective agencies involved in the resettlement operation. 
Finally, it is  imperative that no implication of  charity, 
pity, or aid to helpless people should be allowed t.o filter 
through to the potential settlers and threaten their self 
respect and needed cooperation.  Their self respect must be 
safeguarded  so  that  their  potential  abilities  can  be 
mobilized in the resettlement process.  Having stated the 
conditions  to  encourage  and  those  to  avoid  in  the 
resettlement process, I shall point out certain steps that 
seem imperative in resolving the PR problem as part  of the 
peace process. 
Imperative  Steps  to Take 
The following steps are premised on the assumption that 
wherever resettlement occurs the receiving country will be 
fully cooperative to facilitate mobility and integration of 
the new settlers into the community. We assume also that the Palestinian authorities and  the  United  Nations  will  be 
directly involved in implementation of the resettlemeint plan. 
International agencies should be involved as facilitators but 
not as decision makers as to who goes where for resettlement. 
We assume further that  the resettlement program and the 
resources made available for it are independent of the issue 
of  compensation for Palestinian properties left behind in 
Palestine. The issue of compensation for such properties must 
be isolated from the process of resettlement;  compensation 
is  an  accounting matter;  resettlement  is a  pol.itica1, 
social, and economic process whose success depends primarily 
on cooperation of  the settlers and the receiving country. 
Given these assumptions,  we recommend the following steps as 
soon as possible in the peace process. 
First and foremost is the need to survey the refugees to 
find  out  what  attracts  them  most  among  the  feasible 
solutions.  The PR issue has been on a backburner for a long 
time.  Interest in the refugee problem has been limited to 
the  provision  of  basic  needs  and  containment  of  their 
political activity.  The highly qualified and enterprising 
among them have freed themselves of the refugee envfironment 
though not always the status, but these are relatively small 
in number. Those who have remained as refugees, the rnajority 
of  the  dislocated, are  nationalistic  and  ambitious for 
freedom and identity as political solutions.  To reconcile 
those expectations with feasible solutions is probably the 
most serious obstacle to tackle.  However, regardless of the solution attempted, the objective is bound to be  removal of 
the refugee status and  rehabilitation of  the  solcial  and 
economic life of the dislocated people. 
The success of the solution will probably depend on the 
degree of freedom of choice and voluntary cooperation of the 
refugees.  To impose a resettlement program will no doubt 
meet  stiff  resistance  and  can  easily  cause  political 
disorder.  Imposition would  be  considered  akin. to  the 
occasional suggestions by certain Israeli leaders to conduct 
population transfers to get rid of Arabs in the OT.  It would 
also be as hateful as the  so-called ethnic cleansing in 
former Yugoslav states. 
A different approach is to entice the PR to move out of 
the camps on their own in order to get economic  and civic 
benefits  and avoid being forced to move out or at least 
abandon the refugee status.  This approach will no doubt be 
branded as blackmail but could succeed.  Other approaches 
with lesser degrees of imposition may be applied but all such 
approaches will be seen as imposed solutions.  Therefore,  to 
avoid such an obstructive stigma it would be constructive  to 
survey the preferences of  the PR  from among the feasible 
solutions,  coopt  leaders and skilled Palestinian refugees to 
help in the implementation of  the selected solution, and 
tailor programs to fit expectations to the extent possible. 
To my knowledge no survey of the rank and file of the PR 
has been conducted.  Negotiations regarding PR future and 
proposals for resolution of their problem have been carried out by political leaders and academic experts with little 
explicit or systematic consideration of the refugeesf  desires 
or  preferences.  The  leaders  and  politicians  do  not 
necessarily represent the refugees. Academicians who might or 
might  not  have  visited  refugee  camps  are  not  better 
qualified to reflect refugee preferences.  Though surveying 
refugee preferences  might  have  been  difficult  while  a 
liberation movement underway, the question of  the refugee 
preferences can no longer be ignored,  given that an agreement 
has been signed for peaceful solutions of the Palestinian- 
Israeli c!onflict,  including the refugee problem. 
It is imperative for policy makers to find out what the 
PR prefer, what it takes to gain their cooperation, and how 
best any selected program can be administered to assure its 
success. A well-designed survey would go a long way toward 
answering these questions. The results will have strategic 
significance in the peace process.  While the survey would 
give the PR some say in their future affairs, it would also 
make them aware of the difficulties and constraints t:hat must 
be overcome to resolve their problem.  It would help in the 
design of  the appropriate program and  thus  increase the 
probability of  its success.  Finally, it would enhance the 
position of the Palestinian leaders among their constituents 
and internationally, promote harmony between the PR and the 
communities in which they eventually integrate, and give the 
refugees who will not return to Palestine a certain degree of 
self-respect as having participated in choosing the solution. A second and connected step is to coopt the Palestinians 
in the formulation and implementation of the various options 
that are feasible. Once the survey results are known it would 
be most effective to recruit qualified administra.tors  and 
staff from  among  the  refugees  so  as  to  give  t:hem  both 
employment and responsibility for the success of the program. 
Coopting the PR should serve as a major first step in their 
rehabilitation and restoration of their self con£  i.dence  as 
self-reliant  citizens  wherever  they  happen  to  reside. 
Cooptation of  PR leaders and  staff  should serve also to 
highlight the wealth of human capital they represent and can 
potentially use in building their economic and social future. 
This measure should also prove to be less costly than other 
approac:hes of  leadership and  staffing, given  th'e  social 
savings that can be realized by utilizing local talent and 
gaining confidence of the PR community. 
A third step which  overlaps both of the above steps is 
to  emba.rk on  a  campaign  of  reeducation of  the refugees 
regarding their future as citizens, not dependent refugees. 
The PR  :have  lived in refugee camps or in other conmunities 
as refugees  believing that they have a right of  return to 
their home and country.  They have built expectations to that 
effect, even as it has become more and more unlik-ely  that 
they will be able to enjoy that right. Therefore it should be 
a big shock to them to face a fact that after such a long 
wait they have no "guaranteed" right of return nor any reason 
to hope that some day they will be able to return to home or country. The  PR  are bound  to  be angry  enough  to  cause 
instability in the region.  Reeducation is a way to smooth 
the transition.  The PR should be fully informed about the 
negotiation process, the feasible and infeasible, the costs 
and benefits of  different alternatives, and the prospects 
that lie ahead. 
The PR need to be convinced that they are not being 
abandoned or sacrificed by their own people, the Palestinians 
who are settled, that their status is not uncommon, and that 
solutions are never exactly as one desires.  They need to be 
convinced also that the chosen solution or solutions are the 
best  undler  the circumstances.  Illustrations of  how other 
refugees have had their problems resolved and how they have 
been rehabilitated would be helpful.  Literary explanations, 
videos,  and organized visits to resettled communities can be 
highly  useful  to  strengthen  PR  cooperation,  reduce 
opposition, and provide models for implementation of  the 
chosen solutions. 
The process of reeducation is long and energy co:nsuming, 
but  its functions can hardly be overestimated.  The most 
important  benefit  is  to  strengthen  the  confideince  and 
determination of the PR to succeed outside the refugee camp 
or without the refugee status  and  help of others, in spite 
of the hardships they are bound to face. If successful the 
transf  orrnat  ion through reeducation can also be a preventive 
measure against a backfire by the PR who are denied their 
most desired solution while other Palestinians enjoy theirs. The soon.er  the PR begin to identify with their future country 
or community, the more fruitful will be reeducation,  and the 
more promising its results. 
These three steps are tied closely to the availability 
of  adequate resources, the method of  utilization of  these 
resources, and the amount of economic freedom the individual 
gains b:y sharing  them. The needed resources  are of  two 
types: economic opportunity,  and capital or purchasing power. 
Economic opportunity means that the PR will enjoy the same 
economi'c freedoms  enjoyed  by  other  members  of  the 
communi1:ies  they  join, including  freedom of  enterprise, 
residential and occupational mobility, rights of ownership, 
and security of investment.  The resettled PR should be able 
to pursue any economic activity, public or private, enjoyed 
by the community members without discrimination against them 
because  of  their  newness, former  national  identity, or 
previous refugee status." [Reeducation of  the  receiving 
community  becomes  essential  in  this  regard;  though 
Palestinians  in  Jordan  have  the  right  to  Jordanian 
citizenship and some have acquired it, there are charges of 
economic discrimination against them, even against those born 
in Jordan.  *  [Voice of  America, Arabic broadcast, Oct. 7, 
19941  E;quality  of opportunity for the resettled  citizens or 
residents will help to assure them that resettlement as a 
solution embodies equality status in the economies in which 
they become integrated. It also enhances their incentives to 
perform and excel for their own benefit.  They shoultd now be able  to  buy  homes, become  owner  farmers, shopkeepers, 
business  leaders, and  crafts  people  and  professionals 
according to their qualifications and merits.  Only then can 
they be fully integrated in the new communities and can the 
refugee status be fully obliterated. 
Resettlement capital is the other form of indispensable 
resources.  The PR  have depended  on  the United Nations 
resources for a long time.  It  is time for them to depend on 
their own resources.  Therefore, the resources made available 
to them should be in the form of interest-free loans drawn 
from a revolving fund established for their resettlement. 
The  fund, capitalized from  all  available  international 
sources, would extend loans to individuals and families to 
cover  moving  and  transportation  costs  to  their  new 
communities, sustenance and shelter for a given period of 
time, say six months, and an additional sum to invest in a 
business or  other project if requested.  Repayment begins a 
year and a half after settlement in the new community in 
small enough instalments to be affordable and not threatening 
to the new business or the borrower.  Given that the value of 
an interest-free loan will diminish over time because of 
inflation, it means that its burden will also diminish.  At 
the same time the need  for the revolving fund will also 
diminish because  the  number  of  PR  to  be resettled will 
decline a.nd  eventually vanish. 
One argument against a program of  lending to  the PR 
instead of  giving them outright grants is  that  th.ey have suffered a lot and have lost land and property and therefore 
should not be burdened with loans.  Two points should be 
emphasized in this regard:  the loss of  land and property 
left behind in Palestine is a separate issue and should be 
negotiated separately from solution of  the residence and 
political status of the refugees. It is safe to assume that 
compensation  will  be  paid  to  those  who  qualify  for 
compensation as resolved by  the negotiating team:;  of  the 
respective parties. On the other hand, an interest-free loan 
can hardly be a burden and yet it can be a major source of 
self  -respect, a positive factor in building self  -reliance, 
probab1:y an  advantage  over  the  benefits  enjoyed by  the 
citizens, and a mechanism to assure availability of resources 
for other refugees who will need them in the future. 
An important financial issue is the burden resettlement 
of PR may entail on the receiving communities.  Given that a 
sudden increase of population will increase the demand for 
services  and  uses  of  the  infrastructure, it  should  be 
possible to contribute to those communities adequate funds to 
offset  the  costs  of  absorbing  the  new  members  of  the 
community.  These sums, however, should be in the form of 
grants rather than loans, both to entice them to cooperate 
and  to  free them from the burden of  absorbing relatively 
large population increments from the outside. Rapid expansion 
of the schools, transportation systems, utilities, sanitation 
and public health requires funds that usually are beyond the 
means of  most communities in the Arab countries.  Provision of funds for those purposes will not only make absorption 
possible but it will reduce any negative sentiment against 
the new members of the communities because of  increasing 
burdens on their public budgets. Such expenditure will also 
serve to inject capital, create jobs, and help to integrate 
the newcomers into their new communities. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
Given the imminent peace agreement between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors, it has become imperative to address the 
refugee problem and search for a final solution. In this 
study I have addressed four aspects of the problem: first, 
economic  and  social  rehabilitation  of  the  Palestinian 
refugees is an integral part of the peace process. Second, a 
survey of the feasible options leads to the conclusion that 
resettlement outside Palestine is the most viable option to 
satisfy political as well as social and economic objectives, 
and resettlement in  the oil-exporting Gulf states can be 
mutually beneficial to the refugees and  to  the receiving 
states. 'Third,  success of resettlement options an.d other 
solutions depends much on the degree of choice the refugees 
have and. the  input  they  contribute  to  those  sol.utions. 
Fourth, resettlement resources should be dispensed in two 
ways, as  interest-free  loans  to  the  settlers  from an 
internatiionally financed revolving fund,  and as grants to 
the receiving countries to help them absorb the new settlers. 
Finally, to advance resolution of the refugee problem and 
enhance the  peace process it  is  imperative to conduct a survey of refugee preference, explore ways to coopt. them in 
the design and  implementation of  feasible solutions, and 
establish an international fund to extend interest-free  loans 
to  settlers  and  grants  to  the  countries  as  soon  as 
resettlement becomes possible. 